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Preface 
Environmental law, international and national, sets standards for the 
current use and for the future development of natural resources and for 
the protection of the environment. These standards are in the form of 
rights, duties and liabilities and structured as legal or paralegal rules and 
as rules of competence or rules of limitation. All of these are expressed in 
language. Each of the elements of this normative structure performs a 
different function. For example: 
• statements of rights of sovereignty or property 
• statements of values, policy, strategy, priority or direction 
• statements of formality or substance 
• obligations of procedure or process 
• obligations of conduct, behaviour, performance, methodology, out­
come or result. 
Their sources are international agreements, international customary law, 
principles of international law, practice, constitutions, legislation, com­
mon or civil law. Some are protectable rights or enforceable obligations: 
others are influential or informative. The function of judicial institutions 
varies from adjudication, judicial review to disposition. 
What nation states, national institutions and human beings do or how 
they engage in decision-making is the result of the processes of reasoning 
undertaken by them. These processes are in turn a reflection of this 
complex normative and determinative structure. The processes of legal 
reasoning may be formal - deductive, inductive or analogical logic - or 
substantive - deontic or dialogical logic. The solution to the legal issue 
may be found internally in the text of the legal instrument or externally in 
the material circumstances of the issue or both. 
This book analyses the structure, form and language of a selected 
number of international and national legal instruments and reviews how 
an illustrative range of international and national judicial institutions have 
responded to the issues before them and the processes of legal reasoning 
engaged by them in reaching their decisions. This involves a very 
detailed discussion of these primary sources of international and national 
ix 
X Legal reasoning in environmental law 
environmental law with a view to determining their jurisprudential 
architecture and the processes of reasoning expected of those responsible 
for implementing these architectural arrangements. This book is con­
cerned not with the effectiveness or the quality of an environmental legal 
system but only with its jurisprudential characteristics and their associ­
ated processes of legal reasoning. 
1. Law, language and reasoning 
INTRODUCTION 
The doctrines, principles and rules of the law as an intrinsically intellec­
tual discipline created by humans are expressed through the medium of 
language. Language is the link between these doctrines, principles and 
rules and the intellectual processes of humans. The justification for the 
activities and behaviour of humans and for their decisions emerges from 
the reasoning processes undertaken by humans and expressed through the 
medium of language. Where do nature, the natural environment and their 
associated natural resources fit within this paradigm? More specifically, 
what forms of reasoning support the application of the doctrines, 
principles and rules of the law in the context of sustainable environ­
mental governance? A simple question but with no simple answer. 
The complexity of legal reasoning is matched only by the complexity 
of the evolving structures for environmental governance at international, 
regional and national levels. Much attention has been paid over the years 
to an analysis of the techniques of legal reasoning. The jurisprudence of 
environmental governance is a relatively new phenomenon and only 
recently has attention turned to an analysis of the techniques of legal 
reasoning in relation to environmental governance. Is environmental 
governance different from other governance arrangements? Does it 
present any particular challenges for legal reasoning? Do the legal 
arrangements for environmental governance display any structures that 
are unique linguistically, grammatically, procedurally or substantively? 
The subject matter of this analysis is environmental governance. It is thus 
appropriate to commence with a brief review of the nature of legal 
arrangements for environmental governance as they are emerging in an 
increasing number of jurisdictions - both international and national -
across the global environment. 
3 
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ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL 
REASONING 
Environmental governance seeks to accommodate a wide range of 
interests. These include: 
• the interests of a state as a member of the international community 
• the interests of a state and its governmental institutions in how it 
exercises its rights of sovereignty in accordance with international 
law within its jurisdictional boundaries 
• the collective interests of communities within a state 
• the private interests of individuals and corporate institutions within 
a state 
• the interests of the environment itself independently of these other 
interests. 
This diversity of interests is reflected in the wide range of instrumental 
rules designed to facilitate environmental governance. These include: 
• rights of sovereignty 
• rights of ownership or property 
• procedural and substantive duties limiting the exercise of these 
rights 
• protection of these rights and enforcement of these duties through 
liability regimes. 
This set of rules - here described as legal rules - has been complemented 
over recent years by a range of instruments that have traditionally been 
regarded as beyond the boundaries of the law. These include statements 
of fundamental value, of strategy, of policy, of principle, of purpose, and 
of objective. While instruments of this kind are not unique to environ­
mental governance, they are performing increasingly important functions 
in the context of environmental governance. Not only that - in many 
instances these instruments perform formal functions within the system 
of environmental governance. These are here described as paralegal rules. 
The relationship between these two types of rules is an important issue in 
the context of environmental governance not only in relation to the 
capacity of the system to be enforced, but also in relation to the capacity 
of the system to comply with the rule of law. At the very heart of this 
conundrum lies the concept of ecologically sustainable development 
which together with its associated principles is increasingly becoming 
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part of the textual fabric of the international and national arrangements 
for environmental governance. 
What forms of reasoning are appropriate to this matrix of legal and 
paralegal or textual and contextual rules? Much depends not only upon 
the structure and the language of these rules but also upon the function 
they perform within the overall system. For example, a rule may be 
structured as a right or a duty and the language may be specific or 
general. Language is often neither specific nor general but somewhere 
between the two. A duty that is formulated in precise language is 
intrinsically capable of enforcement. A rule structured in general lan­
guage may require contextual justification to enable it to be applied in 
particular sets of circumstances. Even though the interpretation of the 
text is meaningful, it is by no means axiomatic that its application to 
particular sets of circumstances is beyond dispute. Then there is the 
function to be performed by the rule. Is it procedural or substantive? Is it 
permissive or mandatory? Does it provide guidance? Does it inform the 
interpretation and application of a textual rule? Perhaps the proposition 
stated in the rule performs no function within the overall framework of 
textual and contextual rules. 
Human beings engage in conduct and make decisions in the knowledge 
of applicable rules. The intellectual processes undertaken by human 
beings are reflected in the techniques of reasoning used by them to 
support their activities or decisions. Just as environmental governance is 
a matrix of legal, paralegal, textual and contextual rules, so the intellec­
tual processes justifying activities and decisions comprise a matrix of a 
range of techniques of reasoning. How is it proposed to address these 
issues? The first step in the process is to review the range of techniques 
of legal reasoning. The second step is to examine the techniques of legal 
reasoning that are likely to support effective environmental governance. 
The third step is to analyse the structure and language of the range of 
instruments relevant to environmental governance. The fourth step is to 
review how courts, tribunals and other enforcement and adjudication 
institutions interpret and apply these several rules. The final step is to 
determine whether there is any coherent approach to legal reasoning in 
the context of environmental governance. 
THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF A LEGAL 
SYSTEM 
The law is a social institution. It enables the exercise of power - rules of 
competence - and it controls the exercise of power - rules of limitation. 
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'In Western thinking,' it has been suggested, 'law has sometimes been 
considered to be, by its nature, an institutional power order.' 1 It is more 
than that. For instance, 'from a legal theoretical point of view, it is more 
common to interpret law as a system of norms.'2 In this sense it is a 
system of power and of norms: in other words rules of competence and 
rules of limitation. Consistently with this, in the context of the exercise of 
discretionary power, it has been suggested that the various forms of 
discretionary power 'can be likened by analogy to legally recognised 
forms of power and thus brought within the ambit of the legal world by 
being regulated in accordance with general standards.'3 The juxtaposition 
here is the exercise of power in accordance with general standards - in 
other words in accordance with normative arrangements. 
A norm or a standard sets parameters of behaviour and decision­
making and it may assume the form of a legal rule or a paralegal rule. A 
legal rule is a traditionally enforceable rule while a paralegal rule informs 
and explicates a legal rule. Norms, it has been suggested, 'differ from 
values' .4 Values are not part of the legal order while norms are part of the 
legal order. A norm tells a person what the person 'ought to do' .5 
Consistently with this, it has been noted that 'laws guide conduct by 
prescribing lawful behaviour: that is, they are normative' .6 But norms 
perform more than prescriptive functions. Traditionally, there have been 
two types of legal norms: regulative norms and constitutive norms.7 
Regulative norms set standards of behaviour. Constitutive norms are 
essentially creative. They have been divided into competence norms, 
procedural norms and legal definitions. 8 Significantly, it has been at the 
same time noted that different types of norms are emerging in modern 
law: namely weighing norms and goal norms.9 The importance of the 
normative framework within which the law operates is this. Norms of 
various types and norms which perform different functions inform and 
explain each other in different ways and from different perspectives so 
that ultimately the lawful quality of activities or decisions can be 
determined on the basis of sound reasoning. 
Although norms are distinguished from values, it has been suggested 
that a legal system or a valid law is fundamentally based upon what has 
been described as a grundnorm. 10 A grundnorm exists independently of 
the legal system. Nevertheless it represents the criterion according to 
which a law or a rule of law can be valid. It is not a matter of deduction. 
It is a matter of inference. This approach has been described in these 
words: 
Use of the term 'valid law' presupposes an inference rule, a basic norm. Using 
Kelsen's terminology, Peczenik calls this basic norm the Grundnorm. The 
;;::zaa 
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Grundnorm is an inference rule or transformation rule because the conclusion 
that certain rules belong to a particular normative system and should be 
observed from a legal point of view does not follow deductively from the 
assertion that there are certain social facts and non-legal values. II 
An example of a grundnorm is a constitution. A constitution in 
whatever form, written or unwritten - in practical terms is the foundation 
upon which the legal system is constructed. Why should a constitution be 
observed? If a constitution is a basic norm or a grundnorm, its recog­
nition and hence its validity derive from criteria outside or external to the 
legal system. Legislation and judicial decisions state rules of law simply 
because they are either explicitly or implicitly elements of these consti­
tutional arrangements. The community either accepts or does not accept a 
constitution. Its validity does not derive from the legal system but from 
another source. The point has been put in these terms: 
The decision that the constitution is a source of valid law . . . is based on a 
criteria transformation: a jump is made from social facts and non-legal values 
to the conclusion that the constitution is a source of valid law.I2 
A grundnorm is thus a matter of political rather than legal ideology. 
The substance of a grundnorm is infinitely variable. The constitutional 
arrangements accepted by a community may include a range of grund­
norms. A constitution, for example, may provide for the relationship 
between the legislative, executive and judicial functions performed with a 
state. A constitution may state fundamental values such as liberty and 
equality. It may also acknowledge the existence of 'rights': for example, 
in relation to life or property. These 'rights' are not susceptible to direct 
legal protection: rather they are values to which the community sub­
scribes. Is a regime of law one such value? In other words, is the 
principle of the rule of law a grundnorm? Alternatively, does a system of 
law have intrinsic value? It has been suggested that 'law can function as 
a reasonably just institutional system.' 13 And further: 
This ... aspect of law's instrumental value suggests that, in order for a legal 
system to be reasonably just, it must instantiate a group of values often 
grouped under the rubric 'the rule of law' .I4 
The rule of law has been described as a value. What is the source of its 
legitimacy? One answer: 
Modem emphasis upon the rule of law as a value draws strongly upon the 
ideas underpinning the modem state (as a neutral arbiter between, or 
8 Legal reasoning in environmental law 
framework for, competing interests in a given territorial society) and demo­
cratic institutions. The rule of law gives effect to rules laid down by 
institutions which are legitimised as part of the state and as democratic.15 
The function of the rule of law has been described in a number of ways. 
One is that it 'provides navigational coordinates by which politicians, 
judges and officials can distinguish acceptable from unacceptable public 
action.' 16 This function is performed in two ways: first 'as a norm of 
institutional morality guiding and legitimating public action' and, second, 
'as a supranational concept representing the ultimate principle of legal­
ity.' It is then described as a 'shared grundnorm'. 17 Clearly it is a concept 
but it is also a norm. Not only is it a norm - it is also a basic norm. The 
rule of law has similarly been described as 'the most important of the 
general principles of law' and as 'absolutely fundamental' .18 The subject 
matter of the rule of law has been much debated. It may be procedural or 
substantive or somewhere in between.19 The principles comprising the 
rule of law have been stated to include at a relatively general level: 
• access to justice 
• limited government 
• separation of powers 
• the law must achieve a certain quality 
• the law must guarantee certain basic rights.20 
Ultimately 'the rule of law is the foundational norm and ultimate 
principle of legality, by which all laws ultimately stand to be judged.'21 It 
is accordingly a constitutional principle which sets the standard for the 
totality of the legal system. 
The rule of law acknowledges the existence of basic rights and the 
need for their protection. But what is a right? A statement of a right may 
be a statement of a desirable value: a right to free speech or a right to 
personal liberty. The existence of a right may correlate with the existence 
of a power or a range of powers: for example rights of sovereignty or 
rights of property. A right may be couched in more specific terms: for 
example, a right not to have one's reasonable use of land unreasonably 
interfered with by someone else. Significantly this right correlates with a 
duty imposed upon someone else. Where a right correlates with a duty, 
the right is protected by enforcing the duty. 
It has been the emergence of human rights recognised by international 
law and by an increasing number of national jurisdictions that has 
inspired debate about these issues. This is relevant in the context of 
environmental governance. A human right inheres in everyone and 
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everyone is under a duty to respect it. In this sense there is no precise 
correlative duty. If there were a duty, it would be a duty owed to 
everyone- erga omnes. This is important in relation to the environment. 
The environment has no status by itself within the legal system -
although this may in some jurisdictions be changing. A person may have 
a right to a healthy environment and this correlates with a duty upon 
everyone not to harm the environment. If there is such a duty, it is a duty 
owed to everyone - erga omnes - but to no one in particular. In this sense 
it is a duty owed to the environment. Does this correlate with a right 
inhering in the environment itself not to be damaged? A difficult 
philosophical question but worthy of consideration. 
How might this work out in practice in relation to environmental 
governance? Much depends upon the concept of adjudication. This is the 
starting point: 
The judicial process is structured around the paradigm cases of disputes either 
between individuals or between the individual and the state, which necessarily 
focus attention on issues of rights. The typical legislative and administrative 
processes are more flexible and generally more suited to the wide range of 
issues involved in the determination of the collective welfare.22 
Inter partes adjudication is all about rights and correlative duties. In this 
sense the rights are protectable and the duties enforceable. However the 
'collective welfare' is not about protectable rights and enforceable duties. 
Hence the greater importance of 'legislative and administrative pro­
cesses'. It is, however, the concept of collectivity that is important in the 
sense that it distinguishes between protecting the rights of individual 
persons and securing the collective interests of the community. A 
dialogue about rights is intrinsically different from a dialogue about 
interests. In the context of environmental governance, a person may have 
a right not to have this person's environment harmed while the com­
munity has an interest that its environment is not harmed. The concept of 
environment is different in each of these two cases: one personal and the 
other communal. What are the correlative duties? In the case of the 
former one person is under a duty not to harm another person's 
environment and in the case of the latter everyone is under a duty not to 
harm the environment at large. Thus the structure of the norm and the 
terminology of the norm are equally important. The use of a word such 
as 'right' can be important but it may also be misleading. Nevertheless 
words are important. 
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THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE 
Language, the meaning of words and the relationship between words are 
critical in legal reasoning. Undoubtedly, norms- including legal norms­
are 'expressed in language' .23 Similarly, 'language is the medium through 
which the law acts.'24 But the law revealed through language is more 
than language. In this way: 
Even an initial analysis of a definition which holds law as an aggregate of 
'rules' reveals that rules are both linguistic units as well as ideas or meaning 
- contents. 25 
So the language expressing rules explains ideas and indicates meaning. 
Then there is the relationship between language and meaning: 
Logical deduction, grammatical interpretation, conceptual analysis and recon­
struction of legal concepts . . . are all language-games in which individual 
expressions acquire their meaning.Z6 
The meaning of a rule, in other words, is derived from the language of 
the rule but also from sources extrinsic to the language of the rule. Legal 
reasoning is more than a matter of language and language-games. More 
specifically: 
Though the linguistic expressions in which rules appear may have a penumbra 
of incertainty [sic], it is possible through legal interpretation to arrive at the 
correct meaning by referring the ambiguous expression to something beyond 
it, for example a drafter intent, textual or social context or some idea of 
justice.27 
The issue then becomes the meaning of the rule created by language, 
explicated by reference to wider and potentially non-linguistic sources 
and ultimately applied to a particular factual situation. 
The meaning of a word or words may be found anywhere in a 
'continuum'28 from clarity through ambiguity to obscurity. A rule may be 
expressed in language that is specific or general, narrow or wide, or even 
pragmatic or conceptual. The meaning may be clear even if the language 
is conceptual while the meaning may be obscure even if the language is 
precise. It has been suggested that 'no language is prepared for all 
possibilities. To deplore the insufficiency of language would be merely 
misguided.'29 The indeterminacy or open-texture of the language used to 
express rules is not a new phenomenon. It applies as much to rules 
enacted in legislation and in codes as to rules recognized by the common 
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law. It is similarly an issue in international law. Accordingly 'inter­
national normative language is loaded with expressions which are 
indeterminate in this sense'30: for example, 'the common heritage of 
mankind' and 'sovereignty'. When a practical issue arises for determin­
ation, 'each of such expressions must be translated into normative 
language, that is language claiming to provide a justification for one or 
another solution.'3 1 Similarly national legal systems are replete with 
adjectival standards such as equitable, reasonable, necessary, excessive 
and expedient together with nominative standards such as honesty, good 
faith, equity, national interest, public interest and perhaps even sustain­
ability. Indeterminacy of language is thus no stranger to international 
legal arrangements, constitutional arrangements within states and national 
legal arrangements. 
Despite the specification of rules in either specific or general language, 
indeterminacy of meaning - as distinct from indeterminacy of language -
is a reflection of the function to be performed by the rule in question. 
Two types of indeterminacy have been identified- particularly in relation 
to legislation. But these are probably applicable to common law rules in 
similar fashion. This is the first: 
One type [of indeterminacy] is a consequence of a vague or imprecise statute 
that furnishes virtually no answers by itself.32 
The second is this: 
Words that seem precise, and words that are precise for most applications, 
will become imprecise in the context of some particular application.33 
The first contemplates vague or imprecise words in a particular context 
and the second contemplates precise words in an unclear context. In 
either event, the words are given meaning and then application by 
phenomena extraneous to the words in question. The issue has been 
identified in this way: 
Not all legal rules, not even all legislative rules 'in fixed verbal form', can 
always give a clear answer to every practical question which arises. Almost 
any rule can prove to be ambiguous or unclear in relation to some disputed or 
disputable context of litigation. Rules being formulated in language, they are 
. . .  both open textured and vague in relation to some contexts at least.34 
This does not explain how the rule is applied. This appears to be an 
answer to this question: 
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Rules can be ambiguous in given contexts, and can be applied one way or the 
other only after the ambiguity is resolved. But resolving the ambiguity in 
effect involves choosing between rival versions of the rule; once that choice is 
made, a simple deductive justification of a particular decision follows. But a 
complete justification of that decision must hinge then on how the choice 
between the competing versions of the rule is justified.35 
This takes the analysis to the final point - justification of the decision. 
What has emerged so far is this: 
• the language used to express the rule 
• the meaning of the language 
• the application of the meaning 
• the justification for its application in the circumstances in question. 
This points to the proposition that: 
The role of language in 'easy' cases is thus at best as one factor among many, 
for the clarity of a legal rule's application to some case as a matter of 
language is neither sufficient nor necessary for the case to be an easy one.36 
Language is thus the point of commencement of legal reasoning -
whether in relation to international instruments, constitutional instru­
ments, statutory instruments or common law concepts - but clearly not 
the terminal point of legal reasoning. 
The function of language in legal reasoning is in many respects a 
reflection of the nature and function of the law in the wider jurispruden­
tial sense. One analysis reviewed three jurisprudential approaches of this 
kind: 
• Hart saw language as placing a limit on legal formalism and 
explaining the inevitability of judicial discretion 
• Dworkin believed that any problems created by language could be 
circumvented 
• Moore viewed language, alternatively, as a path to finding the 
correct result and as a temptation towards the wrong result that 
must be overcome. 37 
From any perspective this reinforces the view that the language of a rule 
is by itself neither sufficient nor necessary to reach a conclusion about its 
application. 
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LOGIC AS A FORM OF REASONING 
The identification of the meaning of the words of a rule is no more than 
the first step in the intellectual processes associated with legal reasoning. 
The next step is to identify the intellectual processes involved in moving 
towards a concluded application of the rule to particular sets of circum­
stances. This involves a number of questions. What is the range of logical 
processes that may be relevant? What forms of legal reasoning are 
relevant? Does any coherent pattern of legal reasoning emerge from these 
approaches? The range of logical systems or processes includes these: 
• syllogistic logic 
• propositional logic 
• predicate logic 
• deontic logic 
• dialogical logic. 
A system of syllogistic logic is the oldest and is the basis from which the 
others have developed. 
A syllogism consists of a statement of a major premise, a minor 
premise and a conclusion. The major premise is the rule of law; the 
minor premise is a statement of fact or circumstance; and the conclusion 
automatically follows by applying the major premise to the minor 
premise.38 For example, every person who pollutes the environment 
commits a punishable offence; this person has polluted the environment; 
therefore this person has committed a punishable offence. This is based 
upon the assumption that the major premise states a valid rule of law and 
that the minor premise is in fact true. If neither premise is valid, then the 
conclusion is invalid. 
Propositional logic and predicate logic introduce additional elements. 
This is a broad description: 
The propositional calculus deals with propositions joined by words like 'and' , 
'or', 'if . . . then', but it ignores differences between kinds of propositions. The 
predicate calculus (ie, roughly, calculus of things one can say about some­
thing) takes things further by distinguishing between different kinds of 
propositions. 'All cats are black' and 'some cats are black' are different 
propositions, but with similarities. The predicate calculus takes account of 
these similarities, which the propositional calculus ignores.39 
The use of propositional logic in the context of the law has been 
described in this way: 
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Because legal rules can be seen as a description of the conditions under which 
a particular legal consequence follows, an argument of the 'if . . .  then' form 
can be used for reconstructing a legal argument .40 
For example, a rule may state this. If a person pollutes the environment, 
this person must be convicted of this offence and imprisoned for a 
minimum term of five years. If a particular person has in fact polluted the 
environment, then this particular person should be convicted and impris­
oned for five years. Predicate logic takes this one step further. It has been 
explained in this way: 
The system of predicate logic is an elaboration of the system of propositional 
logic. In addition to arguments whose validity depends on the meaning of 
terms such as 'if . . .  then' ,  predicate logic uses quantifying expressions such 
as 'any', 'all' and 'some' as well as predicates.41 
In this way the subject of the sentence is expanded to include a range of 
persons while the predicate of the sentence remains the same. For 
example, a rule in this form of language. All persons who pollute the 
environment must be convicted of this offence and imprisoned for a 
minimum term of five years; this person has polluted the environment; 
therefore this person should be convicted for polluting the environment 
and imprisoned for a minimum term of five years. This example goes 
further because of the use of the words 'must' and 'should'. This takes us 
to deontic logic. 
Deontic logic has been described in this way: 
Deontic logic studies logical relations between propositions containing terms 
like 'obliged', 'commanded', 'permitted', 'forbidden' ,  though the term tends 
to be confined to the construction of formal systems using deontic terms and 
the problems these systems raise.42 
This is particularly relevant in the context of the legal system. This is 
simply because the law is intrinsically normative in character. While 
syllogistic, propositional and predicate forms of logic are static in the 
sense of their formality, deontic logic necessarily introduces an element 
of dynamism by prescribing standards of behaviour and decision-making. 
For example, a person must not pollute the environment; this person has 
polluted the environment; therefore this person has failed to comply with 
this obligation. This in itself has no legal consequence. Accordingly a 
further proposition needs to be included. For example, if a person has 
failed to comply with this obligation, then any person may bring an 
application before a court for a remedy. 
i!""' 
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Arguably the dynamic nature of the legal system points in the direction 
of dialogical logic. The literal meaning of a dialogue is a discussion 
between representatives of two groups. The legal system is essentially a 
normative framework stating the relationships between individuals, 
groups of individuals, institutions and the community. This almost 
necessarily involves dialogue - discussion - and if dialogue is not 
successful in settling the issues, then there may be a referral of these 
issues to some form of adjudication. There may be a dispute about the 
relevance of the rules of law, their meaning, their application, and the 
consequences of their application. Ultimately this is a matter of judg­
ment. It has been expressed in this way: 
In a recently developed dialogical logic, various authors extend ex1stmg 
logical systems to make them more suitable for analysing and evaluating legal 
arguments . . . Because a legal decision involves a choice between various 
rules, a system of logic is necessary for reconstructing a legal argument in 
which these choices can be expressed. In a reason-based system of logic 
arguments for or against a decision can be weighed. For example, . . .  
arguments from analogy. Thus the process of weighing reasons for and 
against a conclusion always takes place in the context of a dialogue. Thus a 
dialogical system of reason-based logic must be developed to reconstruct 
arguments ensuing from an argumentative dialogue about a legal standpoint.43 
This is particularly significant in relation to environmental governance. 
Environmental governance is a dynamic system. It seeks to accommodate 
a range of potentially competing and ultimately conflicting interests. 
Decisions are being made about future activities as well as past activities. 
It is essentially predictive and evaluative in character. Choices often have 
to be made between equally desirable outcomes. Syllogistic, propos­
itional, predicate or deontic logic may well provide the basis for a 
conclusion. An additional form of logic may often be required. 
RATIONALITY AS A FORM OF REASONING 
Legal reasoning goes beyond an identification of the relevant form of 
logic. Additionally it addresses forms of rationality. Formal logic is not 
enough. More is required. But what? 
Logical validity is a necessary condition for rationality, though not sufficient 
in itself. Formal logic only relates to the formal relation between the premises 
and the conclusion, but leaves open the question of whether the premises are 
acceptable from a material point of view and whether the choice between 
various legal rules is justified. In a logical approach, rationality is not 
/ 
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tantamount to formal validity. A thorough evaluation of legal argumentation, 
apart from logical criteria, requires material criteria.44 
And the reason for this is simple: 
Logic does not offer norms by which to evaluate the material and procedural 
aspects of legal argumentation.45 
The question then becomes how a set of norms can be incorporated 
within a rational system that ensures compliance with the law and its 
effective implementation. 
Three approaches to the achievement of this outcome have been 
suggested. To some extent they are a reflection of the range of relevant 
forms of logic. But these are extrapolated to create a theory of legal 
rationality. These are: 
• the logical approach 
• the rhetorical approach 
• the dialogical approach.46 
The focus of the logical approach is formal validity 'as a criterion of 
rationality for legal argumentation.'47 An example of this approach to 
rationality is syllogistic logic according to which an argument is logically 
valid if the conclusion follows from the legal rule - the first premise -
and the facts - the second premise. The focus of the rhetorical approach 
is 'the content of arguments and the content-dependent aspects of 
acceptability.'48 The issues include the validity of the legal rule and the 
substantiation of the facts but within the context within which both the 
legal rule and the facts have effect. The rhetorical approach moves 
towards the substantive as well as the logical justification for the 
conclusion. The focus of the dialogical approach is even wider. In this 
respect the dialogical approach is similar to but not the same as 
dialogical logic. The dialogue contemplated by the dialogical approach is 
the discussion about the arguments relevant to 'the acceptability of a 
legal standpoint'49 put in support of the conclusion advocated by those 
participating in the discussion. In these ways the logical approach limits 
the analysis to matters of form while the rhetorical and dialogical 
approaches confront matters of substance. 
Although it may be possible to distinguish these three approaches, in 
practice they are often likely to be linked. Distinctions have been drawn, 
for example, between two types of legal reasoning: substantive reasoning 
and formal reasoning. A substantive reason is a 'moral, economic, 
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political, institutional, or other social consideration.'50 The use of the 
noun 'consideration' is important. It contemplates a norm that is not 
strictly binding. On the other hand, 'a formal reason is a legally 
authoritative reason on which judges and others are empowered or 
required to base a decision or action.'51 To the extent that it is binding -
as it is likely to be- it takes precedence over substantive reasons. But in 
practice a rational approach is likely to combine each of these two. Thus 
'a formal reason usually incorporates or reflects substantive reasoning.'52 
In other words, formal reasoning relates for the most part to intrinsic 
logical validity while substantive reasoning relates to extrinsic rational 
validity. 
The combination of these various approaches has been incorporated in 
this figure53 which brings together formal validity and substantive 
validity. 
RATIONALITY 
I I L-RATIONALITY D-RATIONALITY I I I RULES OF LEGAL REASONING I 
I r 
Sources Empirical Moral 
of law evidence reason 
I I T 
INTERPRETATION I 
Source: Aamio ( 1997). 
Figure 1.1 Forms of reasoning 
Aamio explained it in these words: 
The concept of rational acceptability refers to two different constituents, i.e. 
to: ( 1) rationality of the reasoning procedure (discourse), and to (2) the final 
result of this procedure to be substantively acceptable. 
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This rationality of the reasoning procedure can, on the one hand, concern 
either the internal justification, where the deductive form of reasoning is 
essential (Lirationality), or the external justification, i.e. the procedure 
confirming the premises at issue (D/rationality).54 
The reference to the deductive form of reasoning is a reference to formal 
validity - internal justification. The reference to the procedure confirming 
the assumptions underlying the major and minor premises that are part of 
formal validity is a reference to substantive validity - the external 
justification. The concept of rationality in the legal system incorporates a 
set of intellectual processes that analyse the words, the grammar and the 
syntax that comprise the rule and the wider normative context of the rule 
in ways that are justified both formally and substantively. 
The point has been made that formal reasoning may almost imper­
ceptibly move in the direction of substantive reasoning. This arises 
particularly in the context of interpretive techniques. A formal approach 
'focuses on literal meanings of words or on the narrow confines of 
normative conduct or other phenomena to be interpreted.'55 A substantive 
approach focuses upon: 
• the underlying purposes and rationales of the provision in question 
• the political morality of the decision-maker 
• the political morality attributed to the legislature or to the public. 56 
Arguably formal and substantive reasoning may be limited - or perhaps 
expanded depending on the relevant perspective - by any perceived 
fundamental values inherent in the legal system - for example, the rule of 
law. Hence the potential relevance of the concept of formal justice. The 
concept of formal justice may be seen to operate as a counterpoint to the 
exercise of discretion - whether legislative, executive or judicial. This is 
a contested issue. There is on the one hand the capacity for judicial 
creativity in the performance of the adjudicative function and on the 
other hand the capacity for judicial creativity to be constrained by the 
principle of the rule of law. The concept of formal justice is in the first 
instance a matter of procedure. However the function of the judicial 
protection of individual and human rights approaches a concept of 
substantive justice. There may be no clear distinction between procedural 
justice and substantive justice. According to one view: 
The emphasis laid on formal justice relates to the importance of the notion of 
rationality in the liberal-world view: faith in the idea that openness, rational­
ity, consistency, generality, and predictability (values centrally located in the 
rule-of-law ideal) will conduce to fairness.57 
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Judicial creativity, it has been pointed out, impacts not only upon 
activities that have taken place in the past but also upon activities that 
may take place in the future and the link between them may be the 
doctrine of precedent.58 The doctrine of precedent is an element of the 
concept of formal justice. But in any case: 
Judges ought to adhere to the principle of formal justice, as a minimal 
requirement of doing justice at all, and a fortiori 'justice according to law' .59 
However formal justice may be observed by following a precedent but 
substantive justice may not be achieved in the later set of circumstances. 
Perhaps the notion of formal justice should be taken to a higher level. 
Namely: 
It is that the notion of formal justice requires that the justification of decisions 
in individual cases be always on the basis of universal propositions to which 
the judge is prepared to adhere as a basis for determining other like cases and 
deciding them in the like manner to the present one.60 
It is thus the existence of universally accepted propositions of law that 
enables a conclusion in a particular set of circumstances to be justified 
not only internally but also externally. There is no one form of legal 
reasoning. The range of techniques available in the context of legal 
reasoning brings together not only the language of the law but also the 
function of the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The normative framework of a legal system comprises a matrix of related 
legal and paralegal rules which inform each other in the context of 
statements of value, strategy and principle and statements of rights and 
duties. The former statements are informative and the latter descriptive 
and ultimately enforceable in the form of protectable rights and enforce­
able obligations leading potentially to liability for a failure to comply. All 
are expressed in language of relative determinacy or relative indeter­
minacy. Language is one element of the reasoning process. Equally 
important are the structure and form of the sentences created by the 
language and the logical relationship between them. The forms of logic 
vary from the formality of syllogistic logic to the greater complexity of 
dialogical logic. Neither form of logic addresses directly the substance of 
the logical processes leading to a a specific conclusion. This is achieved 
by linking form and substance in a rational way that justifies the 
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conclusion. This involves a process of reasoning that brings together both 
the internal justification and the external justification of the conclusion. 
What emerges is a set of legal and paralegal rules within their wider 
normative context. It is the function of the processes of legal reasoning to 
bring together coherently in relation to a particular decision all of these 
rules within the limits of their application. 
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